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I   Introduction 
For  almost  thirty  years,  the  proponents  of  financial  liberalisation  as  a 
means  towards  financial  deepening  have  dominated  the  financial 
development  literature.  The  World  Bank  in  various  publications  (see 
especially, World Bank, 1989,1998, 2000) sees financial liberalisation as a 
m e a n s  o f  r e v e r s i n g  t h e  d i s t o r t i o n a r y  e f f e c t s  o f  p r e v i o u s l y  s t a t e  
interventionist  policies  which  have  had  the  opposite  effect  to  that 
intended by the original policy. Belief that there is a strong association 
between  financial  repression  and  stagnation  has  been  strong.  Attempts 
have  been  made  at  the  macro-level  to  test  the  validity  of  the  converse 
association,  between  financial  liberalisation  and  growth  (e.g.  King  and 
Levine, 1993; Demetriades and Hussain, 1996; Levine, 1997). At the same 
time,  there  has  been  a  significant  amount  of  research  on  household 
financial behaviour. Policies expected to accelerate financial development 
should  result  in changes  in  household  financial behaviour. Households 
s h o u l d  i n c r e a s i n g l y  r e s o r t  t o  f o r m a l  i n s t i t u t i o n s  t o  f i n a n c e  t h e i r  
investments in producer or consumer durables and also to manage their 
savings. Knowledge of the channels through which this process occurs, the 
speed  with  which  policy  feeds  through  to  behaviour  and  the  income 
groups  it  affects  would  have  important  implications  for  future  policy, 
apart from being important information for policy makers as they monitor 
the effects of changes in policy. The research project of which this is the 
opening working paper is concerned to address the links between macro-
level  policies  which  are  designed  to  develop  financial  markets  and 
institutions  and  micro-level  behaviour  of  households  and  individuals 
within them. As we shall see, there is very little reported research on this 
issue.  This  paper  therefore  surveys  the  existing  literature  on  the 
determinants of household savings and credit in developing countries and 
examines  the  ways  in  which  macro-level  policies  might  impact  on 
household financial behaviour.  
 
It might be expected that monetary, financial and fiscal policies would 
work through the standard channels (for example, credit, investment and 
b a l a n c e  s h e e t  c h a n n e l s )  t o  i m p a c t  o n  h o u s e h o l d s  b o t h  d i r e c t l y  a n d  
indirectly.    However,  the  extent  of  this  impact  would  depend  on  what 
other  factors  independent  of  policy  changes  might  affect  household 2
 
decisions. It would also depend on the degree to which monetary policy 
decisions  affected  those  households  dependent  on  informal  financial 
markets and the degree to which informal markets responded to changes 
directly or indirectly affecting formal financial markets.  Hence, assessing 
the  impact  of  macro-level  policy  requires  analysis  of  the  behaviour  of 
participants  in  both  formal  and  informal  financial  markets  and  of  the 
factors that determine the demand for credit and the supply of savings 
from households in both sectors. 
 
The origins of the debate about financial liberalisation lie with the work of 
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and have been expanded in the work of 
Fry (1995). Most of the discussion in these seminal texts is at the level of 
‘consumers’,  ‘savers’  and  ‘investors’.  Financial  liberalisation  enables 
financial markets to operate effectively. Savers are paid market interest 
rates  and  the  flow  of  savings  thereby  increases.  Investors  have  to  pay 
market rates for credit and therefore have to invest efficiently. Consumers 
are properly rewarded for their patience in foregoing current for future 
consumption. Savers who deposited their savings in the curb markets
1 and 
borrowers who borrowed there shift their activities to formal markets, as 
they become more competitive and open.  Higher savings rates and more 
productive investment generate higher growth rates. 
 
However, is there any evidence that households, who are the consumers 
and savers and investors in the personal sector, and the markets in which 
they operate, respond in the ways outlined above? In particular, the policy 
impact  in  developing  countries  is  meant  to  be  on  the  production  and 
investment decisions of the large number of rural households that form 
the backbone of these economies.  Their savings individually may be small 
relative  to  disposable  income
2,   b u t  t h e y  a r e  s t i l l  a  s i g n i f i c a n t  p a r t  o f  
aggregate savings, as well as of the demand for credit for both production 
and consumption purposes.  
 
This paper surveys the literature in the areas of household savings and 
credit and of informal and formal sector financial markets to discover how 
                                                           
1 The concept of  curb or kerb markets comprise savings and loan activities based on 
informal institutional arrangements, such as savings cooperatives, friends and relatives, and 
moneylending.  The term also refers to parallel markets in foreign exchange, for example.  
2 Newlyn (1977) reports household savings as a proportion of disposable income for 
developing countries ranging from –5% to 16.8% with a median of 4%.  More recent data for 
India has household financial saving at 11.16 for 1992-95 compared with a figure for the US 
in 1995 of 2.7 for ‘personal saving’ (Loayza and Shankar, 1998; Gale and Sabelhaus, 1999). 
The World Savings Database at the World Bank shows for 24 countries for 1992, net 
household savings to disposable GDP ranging from 15.8% to 0.8 % with a median of 5.4 %. 3
 
far predicted household behaviour, derived from the financial repression 
and deepening literature, is borne out by empirical studies. The focus here 
is not specifically on financial liberalisation and its effects on household 
behaviour.  In spite of the big push towards financial liberalisation in the 
last  decade,  there  have  been  other  macro-financial  policy  changes  over 
time that should have affected household financial behaviour, according 
to the McKinnon-Shaw school.  The central issue here is whether macro-
level policy interventions have the household and individual level effects 
predicted by the theory. 
 
The next section of this paper discusses the possible channels of monetary 
and financial policy and how far these affect savings and credit decisions 
in poor countries. Section III discusses the World Bank view of financial 
development. Section IV discusses the literature on the determinants of 
household savings and possible policy measures to increase these. Section 
V  discusses  the  determinants  of  the  demand  for  credit  and  Section  VI 
concludes. 
 
II   Channels of Macro-Policy to Micro-Behaviour 
How might changes in macroeconomic policy affect household financial 
decisions?    One  way  of  tackling  this  question  has  been  to  theorise  the 
effects  of  a  monetary  shock  on  investment  and  saving  behaviour.  A 
standard text book approach (e.g. Mishkin, 2001) discusses this monetary 
transmission  mechanism  in  the  following  way.  An  increase  in  money 
supply increases the amount of bank liquidity and causes interest rates to 
fall  in  order  to  encourage  households  and  firms  to  spend  more  on 
consumption and investment goods respectively.  In this case, households 
are expected to reduce savings and increase spending and/or borrowing.   
Firms are also expected to increase borrowing for investment. There is an 
overall increase in employment and output, especially of credit services. 
T h i s  l iq u id it y  ef f e ct  i s  coun t e rb alan ce d in  t h e  m ode rn  li t e rat ur e b y  an  
anticipated  inflation  effect  (Li,  2000).  Here  an  expansionary  monetary 
shock leads households to expect that the rate of inflation will increase. 
They therefore move out of cash and increase demand for credit with the 
resultant increase in nominal interest rates and a reallocation of labour 
towards credit services. Where the liquidity effect dominates, overall real 
activity rises over the period following the shock. 
 
T h i s  a p p r o a c h  i s  o n e  i n  w h i c h  c r e d i t  f o r  h o u s e h o l d  c o n s u m p t i o n ,  
consumer credit, plays an important role in understanding how the credit 
channel  works  through  consumer  spending  to  deliver  the  desired 4
 
outcomes for policymakers. Here, policymakers are grappling with ways of 
avoiding or smoothing business cycles, and the role of consumer credit in 
this process is critical. For developing economies, the focus is different.  
The  absence  of  well-developed  monetary  and  financial  institutions, 
including markets, switches attention to ways of deepening and widening 
financial activity
3. In this process, financial liberalisation plays a key role. 
The assumption is that releasing interest rate setting to the markets raises 
n o m i n a l  r a t e s ,  t h e r e b y  e n c o u r a g i n g  s a v i n g  a n d  i n v e s t m e n t  w i t h  h i g h  
returns to cover the increased cost of borrowing. Alongside this, various 
constraints on bank activity such as a relaxation of controls on credit and 
on bank reserve ratios should limit the degree to which pent-up demand 
for credit drives interest rates up to excessively high levels, choking off 
potential investment. An assumption that such liberalisation policies work 
is that stabilisation policies are also implemented, especially control on 
g o v e r n m e n t  e x p e n d i t u r e  s o  t h a t  i t  i s  n o t  f i n a n c e d  b y  a  m o n e t a r y  
e x p a n s i o n  w h i c h  s i m p l y  f u e l s  i n f l a t i o n  a n d  t h e  p r i v a t e  s e c t o r  i s  n o t  
crowded out by excessively high borrowing rates.    
 
The  traditional  transmission channel approach  works on  the basis  that 
monetary policy influences spending on investment, including consumer 
durables, through changing financial prices, principally the short and long 
term interest rates (see Taylor, 1995).  However, it has been pointed out 
that, empirically, such cost of capital effects do not appear to be very large.  
For example, Romer and Romer (1990) suggest that an increase of 1% on 
the two-quarter lagged interest rate differential between the federal funds 
r a t e  a n d  t h e  t h r e e  m o n t h  T r e a s u r y  b i l l  r a t e  g e n e r a t e s  a  d e c r e a s e  i n  
industrial production of 0.0173% over the 12 quarters after the monetary 
shock  which  generates  the  increase  in  differential.  However,  Fry  (1995) 
reports studies which suggest on average a positive relationship between 
real interest rates and growth: a 1 percentage point increase in real deposit 
rates is associated with a 0.5 percentage point increase in the growth rate. 
Later studies cited in Fry (1995) have found lower coefficients of around 
0.2.
4 This may depend on the countries and time chosen. There could be an 
                                                           
3 There are of course well developed informal financial markets (see below) though because 
of the nature of these markets data on the shares of formal and informal sectors in such 
market activity is hard to come by (see below).  
4 A study of India by Athukorala (1998) suggests that a 1% increase in the real deposit rate 
produces a 0.2% increase in private investment through the supply of real bank credit. 
Although the author finds a negative relationship between the real lending rate and private 
investment, a 1% rise in the lending rate resulting in a 1.5% decline in investment, the 
overall result is that a 1% rise in the real deposit rate gives a 2% increase in private 
investment. As the author points out this is strong support for McKinnon’s complementarity 
hypothesis that high deposit rates mobilise capital available for investment and that this 
effect is greater than the cost of capital effect. 5
 
inverted U-shaped function with a positive relationship between interest 
and growth in more financially repressed economies becoming negative as 
real rates rise above zero.  
 
In  developed  economies,  the  view  seems  to  be  that  previous  levels  of 
o u t p u t  h a v e  a  g r e a t e r  e f f e c t  o n  d e t e r m i n i n g  i n v e s t m e n t  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  
g r o w t h  b y  g e n e r a t i n g  p a r t i c u l a r  e x p e c t a t i o n s  a b o u t  t h e  f u t u r e .  T h i s  
r e m a i n s  t h e  c a s e  e v e n  w h e n  a  c o s t  o f  c a p i t a l  e f f e c t ,  h o w e v e r  s m a l l ,  i s  
found to be significant (Bernanke and Gertler, 1995).  
Alternative  explanations  of  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  on  spending 
decisions propose a transmission channel based on changes in the balance 
sheet of borrowers resulting from central bank policy changes (Bernanke 
and  Gertler,  1995).  According  to  this  view,  firms  find  that  increases  in 
interest  rates  raise  the  costs  of  servicing  loans  and  therefore  reduce 
profits. The ensuing cash flow problems of firms cause a decline in output, 
inventories  and  investment. Similar  balance sheet  effects are found for 
consumption  decisions  about  housing  and  durables.  Both  effects  feed 
through eventually to aggregate demand.   
 
Alongside these views about the transmission mechanism, there has been 
the strict monetarist view that emphasises relative price effects and the 
neutrality of money. Here monetary policy changes which are not backed 
b y  o u t p u t  c h a n g e s  h a v e  p r i c e  e f f e c t s ,  t h u s  l e a v i n g  r e a l  v a r i a b l e s  
unchanged,  once  these  price  effects  have  been  fully  assimilated  by  all 
agents (Meltzer, 1995). 
 
In both developing and developed country cases, national aggregate data 
forms the basis of the analysis. However, the transmission channel goes 
from policy to household and firm. What is of interest here is how micro-
level agents respond to macro-level changes.  We shall return to this issue 
below. 
 
III   Savings 
In the developed country literature, analysis of savings behaviour has been 
dominated  by  life-cycle  theory  (see  Attanasio  and  Banks,  2001). 
Consumption smoothing over the life-cycle is dependent on the existence 
of well-behaved financial markets for savings and loans. In the developing 
country  literature,  the  possibility  for  consumption  smoothing  through 
participation in financial markets (e.g. credit for housing and durables, 
insurance policies for crop failure, health and old age) is limited because 
these  markets  are  incomplete  or  missing  (Morduch,  1995).  Rosenzweig 6
 
(2001) points to  the highly volatile incomes around  a low mean which 
added to the lack of well-established insurance and credit markets leads to 
limited possibilities for increasing savings rates, highly correlated as they 
are with income and investment. 
 
However savings are still seen as one way of mitigating risk, especially of 
income  variability  in  poor  households.  The  risk  of  crop  failure  or  of 
unemployment means households either build up savings or attempt to 
g a i n  a c c e s s  t o  l o a n s .  S a v i n g  i s  t h e r e f o r e  a  t y p e  o f  s e l f - i n s u r a n c e .  P o o r  
households  are  unlikely  to  save  much,  already  finding  hard  to  gain 
sufficient income to satisfy minimum consumption needs.  Mutuality in 
insurance provision by groups of households is a way that households can 
mitigate  idiosyncratic  risk.  For  very  poor  households  this  form  of 
insurance may not be enough to cope with shocks. Other coping strategies 
may involve migration, increasing the supply of child labour or reducing 
food intake, with obvious effects on health, especially that of children (see 
World Bank, 2000:145).  
 
Empirical  studies  have  used  rainfall  variability  as  an  instrument  to 
identify income variability in order to test for consumption smoothing, 
the  idea  being  that  if  transitory  changes  in  income  did  not  affect 
consumption,  then  households  were  consumption  smoothing  and 
therefore saving and dissaving. The empirical literature in this area, some 
o f  w h i c h  u s e s  t h e  I C R I S A T  d a t a  f o r  I n d i a ,  s u g g e s t s  t h a t  c o n s u m p t i o n  
smoothing does go on with an implication that the lack of credit markets 
may not be as important as theory suggests. There are problems with this 
empirical work because it is important to take into account the question 
of family labour. If the family supplies less labour and hires more when 
there is an output increase because of good weather, then this will distort 
r eal  n et  i n com e un le s s  t h e  im p l i ci t  cos t  of  f am i l y l ab our is  t ake n  i n t o 
account. What is happening is that when the harvest is good because of 
favourable weather, family labour input is lower because leisure is more 
highly valued as income rises. Weather therefore ceases to be an adequate 
i n s t r u m e n t  f o r  i n c o m e  f l u c t u a t i o n s  b e c a u s e  t h e  s h a d o w  w a g e  i s  
endogenously  determined  (i.e.  the  opportunity  cost  of  leisure  is 
determined by the weather) (Rosenzweig, 2001). This appears to contradict 
earlier work by Wolpin (1982) who used historical weather data and more 
recent household income and consumption data to test for the permanent 
i n c o m e  h y p o t h e s i s .  K n o w l e d g e  a b o u t  w e a t h e r  h i s t o r y  g i v e s  h o u s e h o l d s  
information  about  income  fluctuations.  Wolpin  finds  that  income 7
 
elasticities of consumption are close to unity, as the permanent income 
hypothesis would predict. 
 
However, weather is still going to be a important variable in determining 
w h e t h e r  h a r v e s t s  a r e  s u c c e s s f u l  a n d  t h e r e f o r e  d e t e r m i n i n g  h o w  m u c h  
dissaving has to occur to smooth consumption or how far credit is sought 
to do the same. Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find that the timing of 
the monsoon is an important deteminant of output. Using data from the 
ICRISAT village surveys, they find that a delay in the onset of the monsoon 
by  16  days  reduces  crop  profits  by  6%.  Once  again  it  is  likely  that  the 
poorest households will be in the greatest need of some form of insurance, 
but they would be least likely to find an insurer. The existence of informal 
insurance  arrangements  gets  round  this  problem  at  least  in  theory, 
t h o u g h  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  d e f a u l t  o n  r e c i p r o c i t y  i s  a l w a y s  p r e s e n t .   A s  
Thomas and Worrall (2000) note, if the costs of giving, whether in the form 
of  gifts  or  quasi-credit  are  covered  by  the  perceived  benefits  of  future 
reciprocity, then often these forms of informal credit are likely to be more 
effective than other informal or more formal systems. However, there is an 
i s s u e  o f  d e f a u l t  w h i c h  h a s  b e e n  a d d r e s s e d  i n  t h e  l i t e r a t u r e  a n d  w h i c h  
suggests  that  such  informal  arrangements  may  not  perform  as  well  as 
more  formal  ones  in  which  contracts  bind  both  parties  to  a  credit 
agreement (Coates and Ravallion, 1993).  In the case of informal insurance, 
Ligon  et  al,  (2002)  find  that  a  model  of  dynamic  limited  commitment 
works well: here what determines how much is transferred from lender to 
borrower is history dependent.  
 
There are informal pressures which give incentives to repay. As Udry (1994) 
points out in a study of risk pooling in northern Nigeria, in credit markets 
which are confined to relatively small groups of households, a lot is known 
about  each  other’s  circumstances  and  people  are  able  to  lend  and/or 
borrow with greater certainty of acquiring a loan and being repaid, and 
this makes this kind of informal credit market relatively successful.  
 
Consumption smoothing can also be effected by using assets as a buffer 
stock,  whether  bullocks  (Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin,  1993),  cattle (Dercon, 
1998),  or  food  stocks  (Townsend,1995;  Fafchamps  et  al,  1998).    Kochar 
(1997a), using the ICRISAT village data, has suggested that idiosyncratic 
crop shocks can be mitigated by entry into the labour market (see also the 
effect on child labour supply noted below). This raises the question of how 
far  improving  the  workings  of  labour  markets,  linked  for  example  to 
public works programmes, can act as a form of social insurance.  Other 8
 
issues  of  interest  here  are  the  seasonality  of  production/income  and 
therefore the need for consumption smoothing over seasons. The ICRISAT 
data allows for the testing of whether households smooth consumption 
over seasons and Jacoby and Skoufias (1998) (reported in Rosenzweig, 2001) 
get results which imply that consumption smoothing over seasons does 
take place. 
 
Where  formal  banking  institutions  are  present,  savings  rates  when 
harvests are good are higher the closer, geographically, households are to 
the institutions (Behrman et al reported in Rosenzweig, 2001). This raises 
the question of the extent to which banking institutions have an incentive 
to establish more branches to tap the savings of households previously not 
served by such branches. Hellman et al (1996) construct two models. In 
one, they show that limiting competition by giving a bank exclusive rights 
over an area about whose quality little is known, can result in the bank 
gaining  enough  to  cover  its  costs  of  investing  in  the  new  market. 
Government limits on the length of exclusive rights allows other banks to 
enter until competitive equilibrium profits are made.    In another model, 
they show that putting a ceiling on deposit rates allows banks operating in 
the  more  conventional  competitive  framework,  to  make  profits  at  the 
margin.  Banks  therefore  have  the  incentive  to  invest in  attracting  new 
depositors and thus increasing the depth of the financial system.  
 
Households find other ways than saving to effect the smoothing process 
such as marital ties, or changing family size (Rosenzweig, 2001). Deaton 
and  Paxson  (2000)  consider  that  the  existence  of  multigenerational 
households hides the differences between individuals within households. 
They develop a method of deriving individual behaviour from household 
data and then apply this to Thailand and Taiwan household survey data. 
T h e y  f i n d  t h a t  t h e r e  i s  s o m e  s u p p o r t  f o r  t h e  l i f e - c y c l e  h y p o t h e s i s  t h a t  
savings increase with growth as the younger age groups save more as their 
incomes rise. 
 
In contrast to the substantial literature on consumption smoothing and 
the  role  of  saving,  there  is  a  limited  literature  on  the effects  of policy 
change on saving. Testing for these policy effects is an empirical matter. 
For example, a study of personal money demand and savings in China has 
identified several policy changes over the period leading to liberalisation 
(Ma, 1993). Ma shows that personal savings and the demand for money did 
respond to policy regime shifts. Interestingly he finds that the marginal 9
 
propensity to save was much higher in the 1950s than in the reform period 
of the 1980s, but was at its lowest in the highly repressive 1960s and 1970s.  
 
Browning and Lusardi (1996),  in an article whose principal objective is to 
review the literature on why households save, coincidentally take note of 
studies  which  look  at  behaviour  in  the  light  of  announcements  about 
changes  in  government  policy  such  as  an  increase  in  social  security 
payments  (Wilcox,  1989),  or  changes  in  credit  restrictions  (Alessie, 
Devereux and Weber, 1993). 
 
In the former study, consumption, especially on durables, increased when 
sociaI security payments increases were paid, rather than when they were 
announced  six  weeks  earlier.  As  Wilcox  notes,  this  suggests  myopia, 
binding  liquidity  constraints,  or  substantial  credit  market  transactions 
costs. In any case it contradicts the standard life-cycle hypothesis. In the 
l a t t e r  s t u d y ,  t h e  a u t h o r s  m o d e l  t h e  c o n s u m p t i o n  o f  d u r a b l e  a n d  n o n -
durable  goods  in  an  intertemporal  framework  allowing  for  changes  in 
financial conditions. Financial liberalisation appears to have relaxed the 
binding financial constraint associated with regulations on borrowing for 
consumer durables purchase, especially among the younger age groups. 
They find support for the hypothesis that the financial liberalisation of 
1982  generated  a  temporary  boom  in  consumer  durables  expenditure, 
t h o u g h  n o t  t h a t  s u b s e q u e n t  i n c r e a s e s  i n  d u r a b l e s  e x p e n d i t u r e  d u r i n g  
1985-88  resulted  from  further  liberalisation  in  1984  and  1986.  In  both 
cases policy changes feed directly into changes in consumption behaviour. 
 
The  discussion around  the above-mentioned contributions  is concerned 
with policy effects in the presence of liquidity constraints which result in 
behaviour contrary to that predicted by the standard life-cycle model.  One 
benefit  of  looking  at  policy  events  in  this  way  is  that  changes  in 
consumption patterns over time can be separated out from the effects of 
policy changes. Given that most household surveys in most years should 
have  estimates  of  income  and  details  of  consumption,  it  is  possible  in 
principle to look at policy effects on savings independently of changes in 
income and across income groups.  
 
An  interesting  study  of  Russian  savings  using  longitudinal  household 
survey  data  found  that  despite  the  upheavals  of  transition,  households 
saved much the same in the 1990s than in 1976 (Gregory et al. 1999). This 
finding is contrary to expectations since there is widespread belief that 
savings were actually relatively high in the Soviet era because of shortages 10
 
of consumption goods – a form of forced saving, and that saving was lower 
with  price  liberalisation.  In  fact  Russian  households  appear  to  have 
countered  inflation  by  consuming  durables,  but  also  appear  to  have 
maintained saving rates having seen their financial assets wiped out by 
inflation  and  therefore  needing  to  rebuild  these  assets  but  this  time 
holding only foreign currency. 
 
A study of Shanghai households on the other hand reveals a change in 
saving  behaviour  after  economic  reform  (Liu and  Xu,  1997).  Household 
Saving  not  only  grows,  but  there  is  diversification  into  new  financial 
instruments. Under the new system, it is households and local enterprises 
which  have  replaced  central  government  as  the  generator  of  savings. 
Interestingly, delinking social provision from employment conditions has 
meant the growth of housing markets, and therefore an incentive to save 
t o  b u y  a c c o m m o d a t i o n .  R e f o r m s  w h i c h  h a v e  i m p a c t e d  o n  h e a l t h  a n d  
pension  provision  have  encouraged  households  to increase saving.  This 
study suggests that it is important to distinguish between financial sector 
and  other  sectoral  policy  changes  when  looking  for  policy  effects  on 
household financial behaviour. 
 
One set of studies using panels of countries and aggregate data tries to test 
for relationships between key variables and saving and the effects of policy 
on saving. Loayza et al (2000) find that there are long lags between policy 
changes  and  changes  in  private  saving  behaviour  and  that  financial 
liberalisation  reduces  private  saving  rates.  They  find  no  positive 
relationship between financial deepening and saving or between higher 
real interest rates and saving. They do find a positive relationship between 
income growth and saving and this is in line with the findings of Attanasio 
et al (2000).  Maimbo and Mavrotas (2001) in a case study of Zambia also 
find that financial reforms in that country have not resulted in an increase 
in savings rates, partly because of poorly functioning institutions which 
like  in  Russia  result  in  people  holding  their  financial  assets  in  hard 
currency. 
 
One attempt to discover the determinants of private saving across a large 
number of developed and developing countries over time finds that the 
interest rate is a significant explanatory variable for developed countries 
in determining savings rates. However this is not the case in developing 
countries.  Here,  growth  is  associated  with  higher  rates  of  saving  but 
beyond a certain point, as income increases savings ratios fall (see Masson 
et al, 1998). 11
 
 
IV   Credit 
Developing country credit markets are characterised by their inability to 
c h a n n e l  l e n d i n g  t o  t h e  p o o r  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  p o o r ’ s  l a c k  o f  c o l l a t e r a l .  
Borrowers then turn to informal credit markets where risk of default is 
compensated for by very high interest rates or where the cost of credit 
from friends and relatives can be zero (Kochar, 1997b).  Ghosh et al (2000) 
point out that reforms which raise interest rates on these default risks 
may reduce the demand for investment credit. On the other hand, if credit 
is  subsidised,  then  its  supply  can  disrupt  well-functioning  informal 
markets. In some cases even these markets are missing and the only way to 
invest is to accumulate savings (Dercon, 1998). 
 
A key issue is increasing the supply of credit to the poor, who are the 
people most often forced to borrow to survive rather than to invest. One 
analysis of the Indian rural credit market argues that institutions will not 
lend to the poor because even if they do have collateral in the form of a 
share  of  future  harvests,  these  harvests  are  themselves  subject  to  risk 
(Basu, 1997).  However it is easier for Indian peasants to borrow from their 
landlords, especially in a sharecropping system, because their income is 
dependent  on  the  harvest  of  the  peasant.  This  is  the  essence  of  the 
interlinked contract in which credit is extended to the peasant because the 
landlord  knows  that  the  peasant  will  work  to repay the  loan (see  also, 
Braverman and Stiglitz 1982; Bardhan and Rudra, 1980). Here there is also 
a  price  issue.  The  interest  rate  charged  to  the  borrower  labourer  for 
e x a m p l e  m i g h t  b e  l o w ,  b u t  t h e  w a g e s  h e  i s  p a i d  m a y  a l s o  b e  b e l o w  
marginal product (Basu, 1983).   
 
Even where the labourer is able to borrow in a formal financial market, it 
is not clear whether interest rates charged would be meaningful unless 
we, or the labourer knew more about the equilibrium wage. Concentration 
on  the  above  kinds  of  interlinked  contracts  has  masked  what  Bell  and 
Srinivasan (1989) found to be dominant forms of such contracts in the 
context  of  more  commercialised  agriculture,  namely  those  involving 
richer farmers and traders. Their survey across three Indian states showed 
that in the more commercialised Punjab, 43% of borrowers had interlinked 
contracts, largely between credit and agricultural marketing. In Bihar, the 
major  form  of  contract  was  between  credit  and  labour,  where  the 
comparable figure for borrowers with interlinked contracts was 36%. In 
Andhra, both types of contracts were equally represented and covered 38% 
of borrowing households. Once again the type of contractual arrangement 12
 
i n  w h i c h  f a r m e r s  m a y  h e d g e  a g a i n s t  l o w  p r i c e s  b y  s e l l i n g  t h e i r  c r o p  
forward to a trader, have to be taken into account alongside changes in 
monetary policy variables. 
 
Another way of dealing with the problem of the poor’s access to credit is to 
subsidise  credit  using  informal  agents.  Their  knowledge  of  borrowers 
reduces the information costs to formal lenders and their knowledge of 
borrowers’ reputations acts as a form of collateral. Braverman and Guasch 
(1986)  review  evidence  from  a  number  of  developing  countries  which 
shows  that  subsidised  rural  credit  has  failed  to  increase  agricultural 
output in a cost effective way and has neither reduced rural poverty nor 
redistributed income in favour of the rural poor. Hoff and Stiglitz (1997) 
develop theoretical models which show that channelling subsidised credit 
through informal moneylenders can result in less credit going to poorer 
people Their models show that a subsidy may cause the marginal cost of 
lending to rise for three reasons. First, a subsidy induces new entry and 
where there are scale economies, the marginal cost of loan transactions for 
existing lenders rises causing a rise in interest rates.  Secondly, with an 
increase in the number of moneylenders, borrowers may consider it easier 
t o  d e f a u l t  a n d  s t i l l  b o r r o w  f r o m  a n o t h e r  m o n e y l e n d e r .  T h i s  i n c r e a s e s  
enforcement costs for lenders with consequent interest rate increases. In 
the third model, increased entry makes the exchange of information about 
borrowers  less  complete.  The  costs  of  information  gathering  about 
borrowers’  reputations  are  higher  and  the  resultant  increase  in 
enforcement costs drives up the interest rate.   
 
The overall assumption made in the discussion about access to credit is 
that  rural  households  have  a  high  level  of  demand  for credit. Such  an 
assumption has guided government policies in many countries with the 
result that these governments have pursued a low and fixed interest rate 
policy so that cheap credit can be channelled to rural households with the 
objective of increasing agricultural output. The standard view is that these 
policies have led to credit rationing as demand exceeds supply and that 
access to credit has therefore been limited and has often been the preserve 
of better connected households. 
 
Kochar  (1997b)  attempts  to  estimate  the  demand  for  credit  in  rural 
h o u s e h o l d s  i n d e p e n d e n t l y  o f  l e n d e r s ’  d e c i s i o n s  a b o u t  a c c e s s  t o  c r e d i t .  
Using  a  sub-sample  of  the 1981-2  All-India Debt and Investment  Survey 
(A I D I S )  s u r v e y ,  s h e  f i n d s  t h a t  h o u s e h o l d s  a r e  n o t  f o r m a l  s e c t o r  c r e d i t -
constrained and that policies designed to increase the supply of subsidised 13
 
credit  may  have  been  unwarranted  (see  also  Feder  and  Lau,  1990,  and 
Kochar, 1997a).  
 
A further effect of cheap credit has been to change the composition of 
those borrowing from informal rural moneylenders, shifting the lenders’ 
portfolios towards the more risky borrowers.  Bose (1998) presents a model 
which shows that under certain circumstances this ‘composition effect’ 
can have negative consequences for credit availability. Bose cites empirical 
evidence for this theoretical conclusion, some of it based on AIDIS (1951-
71). 
 
Similar  conclusions  about  subsidised  credit  are  drawn  in  theory  and 
practice by Pender (1996) in the context of a study which suggests that the 
high  discount  rates  in  Indian  credit  markets  are  unlikely  to  give  rural 
producers  an incentive to engage in sustainable development practices. 
Subsidised credit is seen as causing greater credit rationing, thus forcing 
borrowers  excluded  from  the  formal  subsidised  sector    into  short-term 
loans from informal moneylenders at high rates of interest. As in Bose’s 
account, Informal lenders will be left with a portfolio of loans from the 
more risky borrowers and thus reduce the supply of credit.  
 
Finally, an interesting method of characterising the effects of differential 
access  to  credit  markets  is  presented  by  Foster  (1995)  who  uses 
anthropometric data on child growth at the time of and following floods 
in Bangladesh in 1988, to show how the inability of landless households to 
borrow can be measured by the lower child growth in these households. 
 
Turning to the relationship between policy and behaviour regarding the 
d e m a n d  f o r  c r e d i t ,  f i n a n c i a l  l i b e r a l i s a t i o n  i s  e x p e c t e d  t o  r e s u l t  i n  t h e  
credit  market  channelling  loans  to  projects  with  competitive  rates  of 
return equal to or higher than the equilibrium market rate. Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981) famously proposed that lenders were more likely to favour 
lending  at  low  interest  rates  to  low  return  -  low  risk  projects  largely 
because  they  did  not  have  enough  information  on  borrowers  and  also 
because in lending to high risk borrowers they were likely to be subject to 
more loan defaults.  The implications for developing countries have been 
that far from interest rates increases leading to moves away from credit 
rationing, they would lead to greater credit rationing by lenders because 
of asymmetric information, with the possibility of less investment than 
b e f o r e .  T h i s  p r o c e s s  m i g h t  b e  a c c e n t u a t e d  b y  t h e  w a y  e n t e r p r i s e s  
themselves assess the  risks  of investment in  the context  of uncertainty 14
 
especially  where  they  are  liquidity  constrained  and  unable  to  borrow 
precisely  because  of  uncertainty  influencing  banks’  view  of  the  risk 
attached to the loan (Patillo 2001).  
 
It is therefore possible that there is a greater role for the informal sector 
t h a n  b e f o r e .  F a r  f r o m  c r o w d i n g  o u t  i n f o r m a l  f i n a n c i a l  m a r k e t s ,  s u c h  
markets would be expected to expand as more borrowers were excluded 
from formal credit. Research on sub-Saharan Africa has found that after 
liberalisation,  it  is  not  the  formal  financial  sector  which  deepens,  as 
financial repression theory suggests. Instead, the informal sector expands 
to  meet  greater  small-scale  service  and  manufacturing  activity,  itself 
expanding because of liberalisation of markets in general. The increases in 
activity, post-liberalization, have been greater in the semi-formal sector 
(for example, savings and credit associations, savings collectors and rural 
cooperatives) than in the informal sector, as more commonly conceived 
(for example, farmer-moneylenders). While private sector credit either fell 
or rose very slowly as a share of GDP in the period following financial 
reforms, there were some startling increases in the activities of informal 
financial sector institutions. In Tanzania and Nigeria for example, deposits 
in Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) rose by 113% and 
77% over 1990-92 (Steel et al, 1997). Policies towards integrating the semi-
formal sector into the mainstream of banking and other financial activity, 
as well as into an appropriate regulatory framework, have been observed 
in Asia, but not yet widely in sub-Saharan Africa  (Nissanke and Aryeetey, 
1988:296-7)
5.    Even  here,  though,  they  are  likely  to  be  affected  by  the 
process of liberalisation and its effects, direct or indirect. As Besley (1995a: 
121) points out, these kinds of ‘traditional’ institutions ‘do seem in general 
to disappear as capital markets develop’.  He cites as reasons for this the 
improvement  of  monitoring  technologies  and  the  financial 




V   Microfinance: a Solution for the Poor? 
As the previous discussion has shown, poor people often have little access 
to credit and savings services even if they are able to save. They cannot 
provide collateral for credit and are therefore often not even served by 
informal financial markets.  One answer to these problems has been the 
promotion of microfinance schemes. Microfinance serves both the savings 
                                                           
5 In 1993, a non-bank financial intermediary law wa enacted in Ghana and this absorbed 
some of the semi-formal financial institutions (e.g. credit unions, savings and loan 
conpanies) intot he main stream of banking (Quartey, 1997). 15
 
(consumption  smoothing)  and  investment  objectives  of  poor  borrowers 
(Johnson and Rogaly, 1997). Many of these schemes have been successful 
both in terms of loan recovery rates and increasing output (Hulme and 
Mosley,  1996),  while  others  have  been  less successful and often require 
continuing government subsidy (World Bank, 2000). The Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh is usually presented as a model scheme in particular because 
of  its  pioneering  peer-monitoring  approach  to  overcoming  the  moral 
h a z a r d  p r o b l e m  a n d  b e c a u s e  o f  i t s  e m p h a s i s  o n  l e n d i n g  t o  w o m e n ,  a  
feature which has been emulated by other schemes (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 
1996). 
 
These schemes and indeed the whole microfinance approach have been 
subject to critical scrutiny. While microfinance schemes have helped to 
empower women, there is evidence that women have often been forced to 
borrow on behalf of men (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996). A study of 253 loans 
to women from microfinance agencies in Bangladesh revealed that almost 
63% of the women borrowers had partial, very limited or no control over 
their loans (Goetz and Sen Gupta, 1996:49). Women then have problems in 
getting the men to repay loans for which the women are responsible. This 
study  raises  issues  not  only  about  gender  but  also  about  the  wider 
q u e s t i o n  o f  d i f f e r e n t  i n d i v i d u a l  b e h a v i o u r s  w i t h i n  h o u s e h o l d s  a n d  t h e  
problems of treating the household as a unitary agent. 
 
The limits of microfinance appear to be recognised by the World Bank in 
its 2001/2 Report and, in particular, the lack of valuable collateral. Credit 
risk is covered in micro-finance schemes by giving participants the ability 
to establish a reputation for reliability in the repayment of loans. Once 
established,  this  enables  the  borrower  to get further  loans.  However,  it 
takes time to establish such a reputation and usually means that although 
the microfinance scheme will lend again, other sources of credit may still 
be closed off. The 2001/2 Report addresses this issue by proposing movable 
property as collateral, by establishing registers of secured interests so that 
lenders can ensure  that it is public knowledge that collateral has been 
advanced against loans, and by establishing credit registries run by credit 
reporting agencies (World Bank, 2001: 94-95).  However, since the agencies 
themselves  will  have  to  prove  their  own  reputation  for  providing 
trustworthy information on borrowers, it is not clear how effective this 
will be in encouraging lenders to accept less secure forms of collateral.  
 
Other doubts have been expressed about microfinance schemes both in 
terms of institutional arrangements and of the appropriateness of such 16
 
credit schemes for long-term poverty alleviation. The institutional issues 
concern  the  integration  of  micro-finance  institutions  into  the  overall 
financial framework, their role as intermediaries between borrowers and 
formal  sector  banks,  and  the  development  of  working  norms  which 
maintain their integrity (Nair, 2000). Micro-finance as directed credit raises 
questions  of  opportunity  cost:  the  goal  of  poverty  alleviation  might  be 
better  served  by  channelling  credit  to  agricultural  infrastructure  or  to 
land redistribution schemes (Nair, 2001).  
 
Nonetheless,  microfinance  is  an  important  development  in  pro-poor 
financial policy. Hulme and Mosley (1996) see ‘market-determined interest 
rates,  availability  of  savings  and  insurance  facilities,  intensive  loan 
collection, and incentives for borrowing and agency staff’ as correlates of 
success. They propose a set of policy experiments which could improve the 
effectiveness of the schemes in alleviating poverty, which include mobile 
banking, interest rate differentials according to loan size, links between 
staff pay and scheme financial performance and between interest rate and 
borrower’s repayment performance and a drought insurance scheme.  
 
Alongside the expansion of best practice microfinance schemes, the World 
Bank argues that governments can best help these financial institutions 
and markets to develop and prosper by investing in rural infrastructure 
and literacy programmes as well as developing a regulatory framework 
which lowers transactions costs to formal  institutions by establishing the 
k i n d  o f  c r e d i t  i n f o r m a t i o n  r e g i s t e r s  m e n t i o n e d  a b o v e  (W o r l d  B a n k ,  
2000:75).  
 
What  is  interesting  about  these  policy  proposals  is  that  first,  they 
recognise  that  the  poor  are  beyond  the  framework  of  formal  financial 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  a n d  m a r k e t s  a n d  s e c o n d l y ,  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  l i k e l y  t o  b e  
incorporated into these markets only by the intervention of microfinance 
agencies.    However,  the  main  objective  of  liberalisation  is  to  remove 
government from direct involvement in the provision of subsidised credit. 
Financial liberalisation in itself therefore does not directly improve the lot 
of the poor, but is meant to promote a market and regulatory  framework 
in which  specialist pro-poor microfinance schemes and institutions can 
operate successfully.  
 
The  Asian  financial  crisis  of  1997  has  had  a  cautionary  effect  on  the 
enthusiasm for the spread of liberalised financial markets. The importance 
of market efficiency and especially informational efficiency has led the 17
 
World Bank to lay more emphasis on issues of asymmetric information 
and financial regulation. The Government, from playing a minimal role, is 
now expected to be both ‘supportive and restrictive’ in its relations with 
financial institutions (World Bank, 1998:81).  As regards poor households, 
they  are  best  served  by  microfinance  schemes  which  promote  group 
l e n d i n g .  H e r e ,  p e e r  m o n i t o r i n g  a n d  p e e r  i n f o r m a t i o n  g e t s  r o u n d  t h e  
asymmetry  of  information  which  excludes  poor  households  from 
borrowing  from the formal sector. There is indeed evidence that group 
lending does reduce default and improve repayment rates (Wenner, 1995), 
while Besley and Coates (1995) have provided a theoretical framework for 
showing  how  groups  might  be  better  off  paying  the  debts  of  non-
performing members in order to maintain the reputation of the group. 
 
However, in formal markets, financial liberalisation ought to bring with it 
increased competition between financial institutions, more branch offices 
of  major  financial  institutions  (indicating  that  such  competition  is 
increasing the overall supply of banking services), increased efficiency in 
transactions indicated by a smaller spread between lending and borrowing 
r a t e s ,  a n d  e v i d e n c e  o f  i n c r e a s e s  i n  c o n s u m e r  d u r a b l e s  s p e n d i n g  w i t h  
greater liquidity and increased household savings ratios as real interest 
rates become positive. The development of financial markets also means 
t h e  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  a  g r e a t e r  r a n g e  o f  f i n a n c i a l  p r o d u c t s ,  e s p e c i a l l y  
insurance. The World Bank advocates policies which encourage and allow 
people to build up their assets but also proposes state funded insurance to 
enable poorer people to mitigate risk. 
 
VI Conclusion 
Household decisions about savings are largely governed by consumption 
smoothing objectives and therefore by the variability of income. Decisions 
about  borrowing  may  also  be  governed  by  consumption  smoothing 
c o n s i d e r a t i o n s ,  b u t  a l s o  b y  i n t e r e s t  r a t e s  a n d  i n t e r l i n k e d  c o n t r a c t s  
involving  labour  and  traders.    Income  variability  may  be  the  result  of 
weather variability so that the decision to save or borrow may be more to 
do with weather than any of the factors usually considered in economic 
theory.  Decisions  to  lend  or  save  may  be  governed  by  the  nature  of 
informal  financial  arrangements.  Traditional  ways  of  risk  pooling  may 
influence savings and borrowing decisions more than income variability, 
or the interest rate.  
 
The effects of government policies on household financial decisions over 
time is under-researched – not surprisingly because there is little long-run 18
 
micro-level data. What evidence there is does suggest that such policies do 
have an effect on households even controlling for these other factors. It 
also suggests three interesting lines of enquiry in the credit market, and 
especially  its  formal-informal  division:  first,  whether  access  to  credit is 
really  constrained;  secondly,  whether  entry  into  the  labour  market,  by 
adults or children is a widespread method of reducing income variability; 
and thirdly, whether liberalisation of credit markets, which presumably 
means  removing  subsidised  credit,  results  in  more  credit  being  made 
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